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Abstract. Deep learning approaches based on convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) have been successful in solving a number of problems
in medical imaging, including image segmentation. In recent years, it
has been shown that CNNs are vulnerable to attacks in which the in-
put image is perturbed by relatively small amounts of noise so that the
CNN is no longer able to perform a segmentation of the perturbed image
with sufficient accuracy. Therefore, exploring methods on how to attack
CNN-based models as well as how to defend models against attacks have
become a popular topic as this also provides insights into the perfor-
mance and generalization abilities of CNNs. However, most of the ex-
isting work assumes unrealistic attack models, i.e. the resulting attacks
were specified in advance. In this paper, we propose a novel approach
for generating adversarial examples to attack CNN-based segmentation
models for medical images. Our approach has three key features: 1) The
generated adversarial examples exhibit anatomical variations (in form of
deformations) as well as appearance perturbations; 2) The adversarial
examples attack segmentation models so that the Dice scores decrease
by a pre-specified amount; 3) The attack is not required to be specified
beforehand. We have evaluated our approach on CNN-based approaches
for the multi-organ segmentation problem in 2D CT images. We show
that the proposed approach can be used to attack different CNN-based
segmentation models.
1 Introduction
CNNs have been amongst the most popular model for image classification and
segmentation problems thanks to their efficiency and effectiveness in learning
representative image features. However, it has been widely reported that even
the most well-established CNN models such as the GoogLeNet [14], are vulner-
able to almost imperceptible intensity changes to the input images [6]. These
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small intensity changes can be regarded as adversarial attacks to CNNs. In med-
ical image classification, the adversarial attacks can also fool CNN-based classi-
fiers [3, 16]. Therefore, it is important to verify the robustness of CNNs before
deploying them into practical use.
The verification of CNNs requires good understanding of the mechanism
of adversarial attacks. In this paper, we aim at developing a novel method to
generate adversarial examples which are able to attack CNN models for medical
image segmentation. Generating adversarial examples to attack semantic image
segmentation models is challenging because: 1) Semantic segmentation means
assigning a label to each pixel (or voxel) instead of a single label per image as in
conventional adversarial attacks typically described in computer vision scenarios.
Therefore, attacking a segmentation model is more challenging than attacking
a classification model; 2) It is not straightforward to evaluate the success of
the attack. A good adversarial example for a classification model results in an
incorrect prediction on the whole image while a good adversarial example for a
segmentation model does not necessarily lead to an incorrect prediction for every
pixel (voxel); 3) Conventional adversarial attacks perturb the image intensity
by small amount, however, in medical imaging scenarios deformations are also
useful to attack segmentation models. For instance, organs can be present in
various configuration in images. Any segmentation model is therefore in principle
susceptible to unseen poses or shapes of organs.
Generative adversarial networks (GAN) [5] and variational autoencoders
(VAE) [9] are both unsupervised methods that can learn latent feature represen-
tations from training images. A GAN learns the latent feature representations
implicitly while the VAE learns them explicitly. Training a GAN is difficult
due to mode collapse and unreasonable results, e.g. a dog with two heads. In
contrast, training a VAE is fairly simple. However, while a GAN can generate
realistic images, images generated by a VAE are blurry because of the L2 loss
employed during training. Inspired by these observations, we propose to combine
the advantages of VAE and GAN to generate realistic and reasonable image de-
formations and appearance changes so that the transformed images can attack
medical segmentation models.
Our main contributions can be summarised as follows: 1) We propose a novel
approach to generate adversarial examples to attack the CNN model for ab-
dominal organ segmentation in CT images; 2) We also measure the success of
attack by means of observing significant reductions in the Dice score compared
to ground truth segmentations; 3) The proposed approach attacking the segmen-
tation model does not require any a-priori specification of particular attacks. In
our application, we do not specify any organ which is attacked.
2 Related Work
The work in [4], [11], and [19] represent state-of-the-art methods for attacking
segmentation models. Fischer et al. [4] proposed to attack segmentation models
so that the models cannot segment object in a specified class (e.g. ignoring pedes-
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trians on street). Metzen et al. [11] proposed to generate adversarial examples so
that the segmentation model incorrectly segments one cityscape as another one.
The adversarial examples generated by these two methods attacked the segmen-
tation models with specified targets, e.g. pedestrians. In contrast, Xie et al. [19]
proposed an approach to generate adversarial examples for image semantic seg-
mentation and object detection without attacking targets. However, a random
segmentation result should be specified so that the adversaries can be inferred.
The adversarial attacks generated by these three methods often appear as pure
noise that has no semantic meaning. Therefore, these attacks do not represent
real-world situations that can occur in medical imaging applications.
3 Our Approach
We propose a novel end-to-end approach to generate adversarial examples for
medical image segmentation scenarios. Formally, I0 is the original image (H
height and W width) and S0 ∈ RH×W×(C+1) is its segmentation given a fixed
CNN-based segmentation model fseg(·), i.e. S0 = fseg(I0). Here C is the number
of labels, e.g. the organs of interest. The adversarial attack model allows defor-
mations D and intensity variations V applied to I0. D is a dense deformation
field which is a displacement vector for each pixel (or voxel) while V is a smooth
intensity perturbation which can be interpreted, e.g. as a bias field. Therefore,
the transformed image after adversarial attack is given by
IDV = ID + V = fD(I0,D) + V . (1)
Here fD(·, ·) is the function which transforms I0 to ID based on D. Figure 1
shows the framework which learns appropriate D and V such that IDV can
attack the segmentation model. The whole framework consists of two key com-
ponents: a CNN model for IDV generation and it’s learning algorithm.
Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed framework. The CNN decoders in blue and green
share the same architecture but they do not share weights.
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3.1 Model for generating adversarial attack
The CNN architecture which generates the IDV is similar to a multi-task VAE.
First, I0 is processed by an encoding CNN resulting in several feature maps
which are then used to learn a latent feature representation zD ∼ N (µD,σ2D)
and zV ∼ N (µV ,σ2V ). zD and zV are then reconstructed to dense deformation
field D and dense intensity variation V by two CNN decoders, respectively. The
two decoding CNNs share the same architecture but they do not share weights.
Learning zD and zV explicitly ensures the IDV looks reasonable.
The dense deformation D consists of two channels of feature maps Dx and
Dy, representing pixel position changes in horizontal and vertical directions (i.e.
x and y axis). In addition, we propose to limit the norm of D and V so that
it is difficult to be perceived by human observers. To this end, the following to
regularization terms are used:
L(D) = λD‖D‖22; L(V ) = λV ‖V ‖22. (2)
λD and λV are two fixed hyper-parameters. The regularization ensures the
smoothness of the deformation field D and intensity variation V .
Each branch of the CNNs generating IDV is different from a VAE since the
input and output of the CNN are not the same. In fact, it is an image-to-image
CNN and we can sample the learned latent space to generate multiple instances
Ds and V s. This idea is similar to the one proposed in [10] where a latent space
was learned to sample multiple realistic image segmentations.
3.2 Learning
Since the ground truth of D, V , and IDV are not available, it is not possible to
learn the parameters of the encoding and decoding CNN in a explicit supervised
manner. To address this problem, we propose to learn the parameters implicitly
based on two conditions: First, we assume that IDV should look realistic com-
pared with I0. Secondly we assume that the accuracy of the segmentation SDV
should decreases significantly compared with S0. This decrease can be measured
in terms of a reduction of Dice score.
An adversarial learning method is employed to ensure the IDV looks realis-
tic compared with I0. To this end, the IDV generating CNN is regarded as a
generator CNN, i.e. IDV = fgen(I0). An additional discriminator CNN fdisc(·)
is used to predict the realism of IDV compared with I0 [8]. Adversarial train-
ing fgen(·) and fdisc(·) results in realistic IDV . We adopt the Wasserstein GAN
(WGAN) [1] loss function during the adversarial training. Formally,
Lgenadv = fdisc(I0)− fdisc(IDV ),
Ldiscadv = fdisc(IDV )− fdisc(I0).
(3)
The goal of this work is to generate IDV which is able to attack a given segmen-
tation CNN model, e.g. a U-Net [13]. This means that the segmentation results
S0 and SDV are different. Here SDV = fseg(IDV ). When training fseg(·), we
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use cross-entropy as the loss function between S0 and the ground truth SGT , i.e.
fxent(S0,SGT ) = −
∑C
c=0 SGT (c) log(S0(c)). This leads to satisfactory S0. To
constrain the difference between S0 and SDV , we propose to use the following
loss function:
L(S0,SDV ) = (ξ − fMxent(S0,SDV ))2. (4)
Here ξ is a hyper-parameter which controls the difference between S0 and SDV .
If ξ = 0, then SDV tends to be similar to S0 so that D and V tend to be zero.
In contrast, if ξ is a very large number, then the norm of D and V are large
that the discriminator CNN is difficult to fool. As such, the training process is
likely to collapse. Therefore, ξ should be within a proper range. In addition, we
propose to mask the standard cross-entropy function so that the ROI of organs
of interest is emphasized. Specifically, the masked cross-entropy function is
fMxent(SDV ,S0) = −
C∑
c=1
S0(c) ∗
C∑
c=0
S0(c) log(SDV (c)). (5)
Here, M =
∑C
c=1 S0(c) is the mask highlighting the organs of interest and ∗ is
the element-wise product.
In summary, the loss functions of the whole framework are:
Lgen = Lgenadv + L(S0,SDV ) + L(D) + L(V ),
Ldisc = Ldiscadv .
(6)
3.3 Implementation Details
In this paper, CNNs are implemented using Tensorflow. The adversarial learning
is optimised using the RMSProp algorithm [17]. The decay is 0.9 and  = 10−10.
We use the fixed learning rate of 10−4 for both generator and discriminator
CNNs. Batch normalization technique [7] is used after convolutions. A leaky
rectified linear unit (LReLU) is used as the nonlinear activation function to
ease the adversarial training with α = 0.2. λD and λV are set as 0.1 and 0.01,
respectively.
4 Experiments and Results
Experiments were performed on a abdominal CT dataset with multiple organs
manually annotated by human experts. The image acquisition details and the
involved patient demographics can be found in [18]. The dataset consists of
150 subjects and for each subject the annotated organs include the pancreas,
the kidneys, the liver, and the spleen. The dataset was randomly split into a
training set, a validation set, and a testing set, which have 60, 15, and 75 subjects
respectively. The voxel intensities of each subject were normalized to zero mean
and unit standard deviation.
We trained a standard U-Net [13] to segment all abdominal organs. Due to
limitations with GPU memory, the U-Net is based on 2D image, rather than 3D
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volumes. Following [2], the U-Net was trained on image patches and tested on
image slices. The trained U-Net was used as the fixed CNN in this work to be
subjected by adversarial attacks.
The Dice score was used to assess the segmentation quality for each organ.
We define a 30% decrease on the Dice score of an organ as a successful attack.
Similar to [12,15], we compute the perceptibility p of the adversarial perturbation
r = IDV − I0 by
p =
1
HW
∑
i,j
|ri,j |. (7)
p is the similarity of the real image to the synthetic image. The smaller the
value of p is, the less likely the adversarial perturbation is perceived by human
observers.
4.1 Adversarial Examples
By sampling the learned latent spaces, the deformation D and the intensity vari-
ation V are generated and therefore realistic adversarial examples are obtained.
Figure 2 shows two such examples. Thanks to the regularization imposed on
D and V , both are smooth and difficult to recognise by humans. However, the
derived adversarial examples attack the U-Net successfully. More examples are
shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 2. Example CT abdominal image, the resulting U-Net segmentation, the generated
adversarial CT images using the proposed method, and the resulting U-Net segmen-
tation of the adversarial images. In the segmentations, the pancreas, the kidneys, the
liver, and the spleen are depicted in blue, green, orange, and red, respectively. In this
case, ξ = 2.0.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 7
4.2 Attacking the Segmentation Model
Table 1 shows the segmentation results of the standard U-Net on multiple organs.
The aforementioned success of the attacking model results in a 30% decrease in
terms of Dice score on every organ. We also listed this borderline of Dice score
in Table 1. In the proposed attack approach, ξ is an important hyper-parameter
deciding the success of attacking the U-Net. ξ ranging from 0.5 to 3.0 was tested
and the results are shown in Table 1. The larger the ξ is, the more the Dice
scores decrease and the larger the perceptibility is. Using ξ ≥ 2.0, the U-Net can
be attacked successfully on all organs.
In terms of different organs, the segmentations on the pancreas and the kid-
neys are more difficult to be attacked compared to segmentations on the liver
and the spleen. Specifically, the segmentations on the pancreas and the kidneys
can be attacked when ξ ≥ 2.0 while the segmentations on the liver and the spleen
can be attacked when ξ ≥ 1.0.
The proposed adversarial examples feature both deformations D and inten-
sity variations V . We studied the effect of D and V individually when ξ = 2.0.
The results are reported in Table 1. For the kidneys, the deformation changes
lead to more decrease of the Dice scores while on the other organs, the intensity
variance has more impact on attacking the U-Net model. This means that the
segmentation model is more sensitive to the intensity variance. The abdominal
organs naturally vary in terms of pose on 2D image slices in the training set.
Therefore, small deformations do not significantly decrease the Dice scores. In
contrast, the intensity variations introduces shadows and artefacts which are
likely to influence the segmentation CNN.
Table 1. Abdominal organ segmentation comparison among different configurations
in terms of the Dice score (%).
Dice
p
Pancreas Kidneys Liver Spleen
U-Net 80.07 94.74 94.71 94.76 –
U-Net 30% decrease 56.05 66.32 66.30 66.33 –
IDV on U-Net (ξ = 0.5) 74.77 93.88 89.81 81.87 0.061
IDV on U-Net (ξ = 1.0) 70.66 90.06 59.51 37.12 0.060
IDV on U-Net (ξ = 1.5) 64.25 66.97 26.45 35.81 0.075
IDV on U-Net (ξ = 2.0) 53.59 60.07 11.19 17.21 0.074
IDV on U-Net (ξ = 2.5) 40.57 45.47 9.16 17.60 0.084
IDV on U-Net (ξ = 3.0) 31.49 43.43 5.82 26.58 0.085
ID on U-Net (ξ = 2.0) 70.46 82.04 75.06 70.47 0.056
IV on U-Net (ξ = 2.0) 68.15 88.25 50.05 46.94 0.061
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Fig. 3. Some additional visual results of the proposed method. Each column represents
an individual case. I0,SGT ,S0, IDV ,V ,SDV are shown from the top row to the bottom
row.
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach to generate adversarial exam-
ples to attack an existing CNN model for medical image segmentation. The gen-
erated adversarial examples include geometrical deformations to model anatom-
ical variations as well as intensity variation which model appearance variations.
These examples attack CNN-based segmentation models such as a U-Net [13]
by decreasing the Dice score by a pre-specified amount. The training process is
end-to-end without any predefined requirements. In fact, it can be replaced by
any other CNN-based models. In the future, we will investigate the use of the
proposed approach to generate additional training images so that the segmen-
tation model can be more robust and defend attacks. In addition, the proposed
approach can be used to verify if an CNN model is robust or not. Specifically, our
approach can generate adversarial examples for the CNN model. If the adver-
sarial examples are reasonable and realistic, then the CNN model is not robust
enough.
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